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CAPTAIN JAMES COOK'S contact with the Hawaiian Islands gave
Great Britain a certain pre-eminence in Hawaiian history and
attitudes which remained for some time, and was commemorated
in the placing of the British Union Jack in Hawai'i's national flag,
now the Hawai'i State flag. The British government's disavowal
in 1843 of the takeover of Honolulu by a British naval officer and
its formal restoration of Hawaiian independence ushered in a
period of Hawaiian attachment to Great Britain which made it
appear as if Hawai'i would eventually gravitate into Britain's
orbit. Actually, however, Hawai'i's ultimate place in the scheme
of things was already decided in favor of the United States. Amer-
ican economic and missionary activity in the Islands during the
first half of the 19th century had already made Hawai'i's absorp-
tion by the United States a matter of time. That the Islands were
not absorbed earlier was more the result of a disinclination of the
United States to do so than anything else. The American declara-
tion of 1854 guaranteeing Hawaiian independence made the
Islands in effect an American protectorate and the United States
henceforth the determiner of Hawai'i's destiny.
Perhaps because the British recognized the close connection
between the United States and the Hawaiian Kingdom, they con-
sistently kept a careful eye out for what might be attempts to bring
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that connection even closer. In spite of American disclaimers,
annexation of Hawai'i remained a possibility. The British realized
that barring an overt effort to simply take the Hawaiian Islands—
an unlikely possibility—the most likely circumstance encouraging
an American annexation attempt would grow out of instability
within Hawai'i itself. During the reigns of the last two Kameha-
mehas, internal dissension or unrest did not appear, and after the
short tragic reign of Lunalilo the Kingdom came to be ruled by
David Kalakaua. At first it appeared that Kalakaua's reign would
be unusually stable, marked as it was by the famous Reciprocity
Treaty of 1875 with the United States. This treaty bound Hawai'i
even more firmly to the United States and made an American
attempt at annexation more remote than ever.
The optimism of the early years of Kalakaua's reign gave way
to increasing concern on the part of both the British and the
Americans, as they saw the Hawaiian government under the lead-
ership of Walter Murray Gibson become increasingly unstable
through unbridled spending which ran up a large debt and
brought corruption among government officials in its wake. Also
alarming was the unabashed appeal to factionalism by leaders like
Gibson who sought to keep political power by stirring up the
Native Hawaiians against the haole (Caucasian) residents, who
over the years had come to control the major economic activities
of the Kingdom. By early 1887 the situation had reached such a
point that haole residents, mostly Americans but including some
British, Germans, and other Europeans, were beginning to plot
moves to overthrow Gibson and bring Kalakaua under control.1
Deeply concerned about these developments was John Hay
Wodehouse, Her Britannic Majesty's representative as British
Commissioner to the Hawaiian Kingdom. A retired British Army
major, Wodehouse arrived in Honolulu in January 1874 to take up
his duties, only a month or so before Kalakaua became King.
Thereafter Wodehouse worked diligently to protect British inter-
ests during a long career which spanned two decades.
In the first half of 1887, Wodehouse was a witness of the internal
unrest which culminated in the revolt of June 30, when the Cau-
casians rose in arms, forced the dismissal of Gibson, and brought
into effect a new constitution which gave them greatly increased
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political power and severely curtailed the powers of the King. As
Wodehouse saw events unfolding he was particularly concerned
that nothing be done to provoke bloodshed and disorder for fear
both of the threat to British lives and property and also the possi-
bility of American intervention and demands for annexation. His
actions in 1887 included asking that the British Pacific Squadron
send a warship to Honolulu—the ship arrived nearly two weeks
after the uprising—and counseling King Kalakaua to submit to
the demands of the dissenters to avoid bloodshed.2 Wodehouse's
actions—arranging for the presence of a British warship and urg-
ing the Hawaiian authorities to avoid hasty action—became the
pattern of his response to the tumultuous events of the next half
decade, and these became policy when the British government
invariably approved of his actions.
The Constitution of 1887 did not calm the internal agitation
which had characterized the Gibson years; on the contrary, it
seemed to increase it. Native Hawaiians were furious at the cur-
tailment of the sovereign's power and were angry at what they
considered to be the establishment of political dominance by the
Caucasians. Racial tension grew instead of diminishing. Several
political figures attempted to take Gibson's place as leader of an
anti-haole movement, the most prominent of these being Robert
W. Wilcox. A part-Hawaiian who had received military training
in Italy, Wilcox led an abortive attempt to replace the 1887 Consti-
tution by taking over the royal palace on July 30, 1889. He
planned to persuade the King to declare a new constitution. An
ever-watchful Wodehouse, who earlier had gotten wind of the
Wilcox plot and had tried to get the King to do something about
it,3 was concerned that no foreign warships would be in port when
the uprising was scheduled to occur. Wodehouse had even gone so
far as to persuade William Merrill, the American Minister, to
keep in port an American cruiser which was to have left earlier.4
He did this even though he feared the American government
might use a situation of civil war in the Islands to justify an Amer-
ican takeover.
Thanks to quick action by the local haole-\ed government, the
Wilcox uprising was smashed, and the government remained in
effective control. But Wilcox became a popular hero among the
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Hawaiians, and the "bayonet constitution" and those who sup-
ported it remained an object of hatred and divisiveness in the
community. During the next two years events moved to a climax.
The haole and the Natives became more polarized after Kala-
kaua's death in 1891 and the succession to the throne of Lili'uoka-
lani, who was determined to do away with the existing constitu-
tion. Her attempt to do so after the distressing and ineffectual
session of the legislature of 1892 brought the crisis which led to a
rapid and profound change in Hawai'i's political system and in its
relations with other countries.
THE REVOLUTION OF 1893
Much has been written about the Hawaiian Revolution of 1893
which overthrew the Monarchy and brought Hawai'i very close
to annexation to the United States shortly thereafter. The British
government's role in those events, however, has not received
much attention even though next to the United States Great Brit-
ain was most concerned with and affected by the Revolution. The
British position was determined long before, during the period
briefly summarized above. The view of the government in White-
hall was simply that the situation in the Hawaiian Kingdom
should not be allowed to deteriorate into insurrection and civil
strife, but if it did, every effort should be made to see to it that
Americans in the Islands or in the United States did not use inter-
nal disorder as a justification for American annexation. As the
man on the spot it was Commissioner Wodehouse who was
largely responsible both for making and for carrying out British
policy.
As usual, Wodehouse followed closely the events of the last
months of 1892 and of early 1893. He w a s sympathetic toward
Lili'uokalani, both because of his attachment to the continuation
of the Hawaiian Monarchy and because of his belief that she stood
against the designs of those Americans in the Islands who wanted
annexation to the United States as a permanent solution to the
political turmoil in the Islands. He defended her action in dis-
missing a cabinet she could no longer trust or support and
appointing a new one more to her liking on September 1, 1892.5
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He dutifully reported his concern over rumors of a possible
takeover by the United States government6 and asked that a Brit-
ish warship be stationed in Hawai'i indefinitely to offset an
increasing American naval presence at Honolulu.7
The Queen's action in unilaterally attempting to proclaim a
new constitution just after the adjournment of the legislative ses-
sion on January 14, 1893 s e t off the haole reaction which overthrew
her and sought immediate annexation to the United States.
Wodehouse was appalled at both developments and objected
strenuously both to the Hawaiian Provisional Government and to
American Minister John L. Stevens, who had ordered American
sailors and marines landed from an American warship to main-
tain order in Honolulu. Wodehouse protested to Minister Stevens
concerning this action but was told the leaders of the rebellion had
requested the landing of the troops. Furthermore, Stevens indi-
cated the military presence ashore would continue for as long as
the Provisional Government decided it should.8 Wodehouse was
not content with this answer but continued to try to get the troops
removed. On January 30, he expressed concern to Sanford B.
Dole, President of the Provisional Government, that the men
from U.S.S. Boston were still ashore. Noting that newspaper
reports were full of stories about the strength of the military forces
of the Provisional Government, he professed not to understand
why the American troops were needed. "I am therefore con-
strained to again ask Your Excellency why this Foreign Force is
not recalled."9 The next day Dole replied. He did not reply in
detail to Wodehouse's letter, saying only that the American forces
must remain for the time being for "the general protection of life
and property."10
Nothing more could be done. By now Wodehouse knew that all
the other foreign government representatives in Hawai'i had
extended diplomatic recognition to the Provisional Government,
and it was becoming embarrassing that he had not. So on January
31 he extended de facto recognition on his own authority. In his
report home, he indicated his hope that recognition would
strengthen anti-annexationist feeling in the Islands and would
stimulate an abdication by Lili'uokalani in favor of her niece
Princess Ka'iulani. He also asked—it was beginning to seem like
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a refrain—for a British warship to be stationed in Hawaiian
waters.11 The British government approved recognition but saw
no reason to send a warship.12
Wodehouse's reference to Princess Ka'iulani was an expression
of a plan being considered by English residents in Hawai'i,
headed by Theophilus H. Davies, a businessman and longtime
resident, to persuade Lili'uokalani to abdicate in favor of her
niece. Ka'iulani, then 17 years of age, was the daughter of
Lili'uokalani's younger sister Miriam Likelike and Archibald S.
Cleghorn, a Scotsman. Raised with British schoolmasters and at
that time completing her education in England, Ka'iulani was
considered thoroughly British in her outlook. In late 1891, she had
been designated heir to the throne by the childless Queen. Davies,
who was Ka'iulani's mentor and guardian, considered this a for-
tunate circumstance, and for some time he had been working to
make Ka'iulani as British as possible through education. Her
claim to the throne was clear, and if Lili'uokalani agreed to abdi-
cate, Ka'iulani would become queen, and through her the objects
both of increase of British influence and an anti-annexation gov-
ernment policy could be achieved. Davies advanced this idea to
the British Foreign Office with Wodehouse's approval.13 Many
people in Hawai'i, including Dole, would have been satisfied if
Ka'iulani had become queen, but it was not a practical idea. The
Americans, who had largely engineered the Revolution, were
tired of the Monarchy and had previously declared the Monarchy
ended. They wanted annexation as a way of ending Hawai'i's
constant political squabbling.14 Presumably too, these people
would not tolerate for long a sovereign with pro-British sym-
pathies, no matter how circumspect she might be about express-
ing them. On the other hand, the placing of Ka'iulani upon the
throne would probably have stopped the current moves toward
annexation and assured an immediate future of greater Hawaiian
openness toward the extension of British interests. The British
government neither supported nor discouraged this scenario, but
if it had come about the government would probably have been
satisfied with it.
Regardless of the strict neutral attitude of the British govern-
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ment, Wodehouse's obvious hostility to the Hawaiian Provisional
Government seems to have encouraged Lili'uokalani's supporters
and the former Queen herself into believing that the British might
be persuaded to support her restoration. On January 31, Lili'uo-
kalani summoned Wodehouse and gave him a letter to Queen
Victoria, asking for her help in getting the British government to
support her restoration to the throne. She alluded in this docu-
ment to her surrender to the rebels as being caused by her desire
"to avoid violence and bloodshed, and damage to my subjects."15
It was the expression of a theme she would expound upon later.
Victoria's reply conveyed her assurances of "our highest consid-
eration and regard" but was not helpful in pledging British sup-
port for Lili'uokalani's cause. Instead, she recommended the
Hawaiian Monarch "to the protection of the Almighty."16 The
British government did not want to become involved.
During the next few months, two trends became clear. The first
was that the Provisional Government was there to stay. The
annexation treaty which had been quickly drawn up by a group of
haole representatives sent to Washington had been submitted to
the Senate by the outgoing Harrison administration, but Grover
Cleveland became President before it could be acted upon. He
quickly withdrew the treaty from consideration and sent an inves-
tigator to Hawai'i to conduct an inquiry into the actions of
Stevens in possibly interfering in the Revolution. Thus, the sec-
ond trend was the growing probability that the United States
would not annex the Islands.
As the new situation began to clarify, Great Britain came under
increasing criticism from some quarters in the United States and
Hawai'i. Wodehouse's nearly constant complaints to the Hawai-
ian Provisional Government had by now made him fairly unpop-
ular among the government's supporters. His demands that the
American naval landing parties be withdrawn was a consistent
complaint, as was his request that the American flag, which had
been raised over 'Iolani Palace, be taken down.17 The status of an
American protectorate implied by the flag was improper, and in
view of the fact that the ability of the Provisional Government to
maintain order was unquestioned, Wodehouse said, it was no
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longer necessary for the American flag to be flown. The flag was
removed, not because of Wodehouse, but because the American
investigator, Senator James Blount, ordered it to be taken down.
Local criticisms of Wodehouse aside, the mounting attacks on
Great Britain from the American press began to cause some con-
cern to British officials. The British Minister in Washington,
Lord Pauncefote, noted the increasing criticism and expressed his
frustration at the nature of some of it. The New Evening Post, for
example, said the British failure to register an immediate protest
was "most exasperating." Everyone knew the British wanted to
protest. Why didn't they? Were they afraid a British protest
would be the quickest way to cause the United States to annex
Hawai'i?18 Perhaps, said Pauncefote, the British lack of action is
confounding those who want annexation quickly. If that were so,
the British refusal to take sides and to remain uninvolved was
smart strategy from the British point of view.
The official British neutral stance was not reflected in Wode-
house's conduct during the period between the spring of 1893 anc^
the middle of 1894 when the Hawaiian Republic was established.
In countless ways, the British Commissioner harassed the Provi-
sional Government, his sally concerning the flying of the Ameri-
can flag over the Palace being typical. On one occasion, he asked
that the government sponsor a referendum to give the Hawaiian
people an opportunity "to express their sentiments on the ques-
tion of the annexation of these Islands to the United States of
America before any final steps are taken in this matter."19 An
irked Dole replied that he would be happy to receive from the
British Government precedents "wherein a similar course has
been followed by Her Britannic Majesty's Government in the es-
tablishment of territorial jurisdiction over islands in this ocean."20
Varying his tactics, Wodehouse refused to accept invitations to
attend various official functions. One example was an official
reception honoring Captain George C. Wiltse, Commander of
the U.S.S. Boston, who had ordered the American naval forces
ashore during the Revolution. In his report, Wodehouse stated
that little notice was taken of this celebration and attendance was
very poor.21 On the occasion of the celebration of the first anni-
versary of the Revolution on January 17,1894, Wodehouse did not
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even reply to an invitation to attend sent by Dole, telling Dole
later only that he had been unable to join the observance.22 He
also did not attend the ceremonies at the opening of the Constitu-
tional Convention to establish a constitution for the new Hawai-
ian Republic.23
Wodehouse showed his displeasure with the Dole government
in other ways. His reports to his government were strongly biased
in favor of the Native Hawaiians and the Monarchy. He wrote to
Lord Rosebery of his concern over the security measures taken by
the Provisional Government and referred several times to the
government as "a military despotism."24 He went out of his way
to cultivate Senator Blount. Presumably Blount's mission would
be of most value to the British government if it led to an American
repudiation of the Revolution and a restoration of the Queen, and
Wodehouse seems to have done what he could to bring about such
an outcome.25 As Wodehouse hoped and expected, Blount's
report excoriated Stevens and the Hawaiian rebels and recom-
mended the restoration of Lili'uokalani.
To an extent Wodehouse's and the British government's con-
cern in the aftermath of the Hawaiian Revolution was motivated
locally by actions taken by the Provisional Government against
British citizens in Honolulu for allegedly subversive activities,
and nationally by fears that British trade might be adversely
affected by an American annexation of the Hawaiian Islands.
Concerning the former, Wodehouse remonstrated on behalf of
G. C. Kenyon and Percy Gardiner, British citizens who had been
arrested for seditious activities involving criticism of the Provi-
sional Government.26 Wodehouse also complained about attacks
made upon him personally by the Hawaiian Star, a pro-annexation
newspaper, and demanded that Dole put a stop to them.27 As for
the trade problem, the British fears resulted from the knowledge
that annexation by the United States would bring U.S.-Hawai'i
trade into the realm of the American coastal trade immediately
and would thereby prohibit British ships from carrying goods
between Hawai'i and the U.S. Mainland. It would be a severe
blow, since most Hawaiian raw sugar destined for West Coast
refineries was carried in British merchant vessels.28 Fortunately,
Blount's report together with Cleveland's earlier action meant the
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end of the annexation movement at that time, and the British
could breathe a sigh of relief.
CORRECT BUT DISTANT: RELATIONS WITH THE REPUBLIC
Cleveland believed that the United States, by acting against
Lili'uokalani, in effect, had a moral obligation to restore her to
her throne. His attempt at restoration ran afoul of the Queen's
initial determination to punish those who had rebelled against her
and ultimately was undone by the unexpected determination of
the leaders of the Provisional Government not to accept the resto-
ration of the Monarchy even with the power of the United States
thrown against them. Cleveland's unwillingness to use force to
bring about a restoration, plus his refusal to accept the opportu-
nity offered to annex Hawai'i, left matters at a stalemate. By
early 1894 Dole and the other Provisional Government leaders
began to make plans to establish a republic which could function
as a viable government until such time as the Americans were
willing to accept the gift so freely offered them.
The establishment of the Republic of Hawai'i on July 4, 1894
was a stopgap. Internally, dissatisfaction among the Native
Hawaiians was assured. A constitutional convention, chosen by
an electorate limited mainly to property holders who swore an
oath of allegiance to the Provisional Government—a step which
most Natives would not take—drew up a constitution which not
only set aside the continuation of the Monarchy in any form but
also established voting and officeholding qualifications so strict
that only a few Natives, and no Orientals, could meet them. It
was an oligarchic government which was controlled by the haole,
particularly Americans. On the external side, the failure of the
annexation movement gave the British some hope that the Islands
might somehow remain independent. The hope was not strong,
however, except for the immediate future. It appeared more cer-
tain than ever that Hawai'i's ultimate destiny lay in becoming a
part of the United States. While the American government
eschewed possession, it did continue close economic relations with
the Republic by passing the Wilson-Gorman Tariff of 1894, which
removed the subsidy paid to domestic sugar producers and
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restored the duty on foreign sugar. Since the U.S.-Hawaiian Rec-
iprocity Treaty was still in effect, Hawaiian sugar did not have to
pay the duty. So the sugar industry, the mainstay of Hawai'i's
economy, was assured once more of a steady and profitable mar-
ket. None of this was particularly encouraging to the British gov-
ernment's policy of keeping Hawai'i out of the American orbit as
far as possible.
By the time the Republic was established, Wodehouse had
clearly become an impediment to the maintenance of good rela-
tions between the Republic and Great Britain. Francis M. Hatch,
the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the new regime, was convinced
that Wodehouse was in league with Lili'uokalani and her follow-
ers to restore the Monarchy. It was true that there was a good deal
of communication between the former Queen and the British
minister, but most of it was instigated by Lili'uokalani.29 Wode-
house had been supportive of the Monarchy in the months imme-
diately following the Revolution, but he had come to believe that
the Queen should not be supported any longer after she had
refused for a time to accede to the American government's
request to deal leniently with the rebels as a condition of Ameri-
can support for her restoration.30 The view that Wodehouse was
working to undermine the Hawaiian government had become
widespread, however, and he realized his usefulness was coming
to an end.31
Wodehouse had other reasons for desiring to be relieved of his
duties at this time. He had been in Hawai'i for 15 years without
any leave, was not in good health, and wished to return to Eng-
land to spend his last years. The British government accordingly
granted him leave to return to England and began preparations to
send a replacement.
Wodehouse's replacement, Albert George Sidney Hawes, was
a former Royal Marine officer. After spending 13 years helping to
organize a marine component for the Japanese Navy, he had
joined the British Foreign Service and had been in several posts in
Africa and the Pacific before coming to Hawai'i.
Hawes arrived in Honolulu early in July 1894. He was almost
immediately involved in some difficulties concerning Wode-
house's official position until Wodehouse left Hawai'i for England
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in September.32 He was also much concerned in the question of
British recognition of the Hawaiian Republic. Most countries fol-
lowed the lead of the United States, which recognized the Repub-
lic at the end of August, but Hawes believed that President Cleve-
land's letter to the Hawaiian government did not constitute an
official recognition. The British government agreed, thus causing
some delay before the British conferred recognition. On Novem-
ber 15 Hawes handed President Dole the affirmation of recogni-
tion by Queen Victoria.33 Great Britain thus was the last in the
list of countries granting diplomatic recognition to the Hawaiian
Republic.
During the fall of 1894, the most important diplomatic effort
concerning the two countries was the negotiations concerned with
the laying of a trans-Pacific cable. The idea of a cable across the
Pacific had been around for some time, and in the fall of 1893 the
British Colonial Office began working on plans to lay a cable from
British Columbia to Australia by way of Hawai'i. The Foreign
Office did not support the plan at that time, saying that the Provi-
sional Government was only temporary and that the British gov-
ernment did not consider it to have the authority to negotiate an
agreement to cede or lease territory which would be required for a
cable station in the Islands.34
After it became clear that the United States would not annex
Hawai'i and the Hawaiian authorities were moving to establish a
republic, the British began to reconsider. In order to promote
American support and reduce opposition in Hawai'i, the British
revised their original plan to include a branch cable to Honolulu.
Thus Hawai'i would be connected not only to Canada but also
via existing cable lines to the United States. In talks between Lord
Pauncefote and Secretary of State Walter Q. Gresham in Wash-
ington in March 1894, the American government considered the
improvement of communication between Hawai'i and the United
States a positive benefit and indicated support for the idea.35
Thereafter events moved quickly. The Foreign Office author-
ized the Canadian Dominion government to send an agent to
negotiate a cable agreement with the new Hawaiian Republic on
behalf of both the British and Canadian governments. An agree-
ment should include the right to occupy "in perpetuity" an island
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for a cable station.36 The agent, Sandford Fleming, arrived in
Honolulu on October 6. He and Foreign Minister Hatch entered
into negotiation at the Hawaiian Hotel and in less than two weeks
had arrived at an agreement. On the day the cable agreement was
signed, Hawes wrote jubilantly to the Earl of Rosebery, the For-
eign Office Official administering the cable negotiations, an-
nouncing success.37
Unfortunately, Hawes' announcement was premature. The
Hawaiian government wanted a cable, but it preferred an Ameri-
can one. The government's Executive Council did not like the
British proposal, which involved a free lease of Necker Island to
the British, plus payment of an annual subsidy to the British cable
firm. In return, the British would lay a branch cable from Necker
to Honolulu. Although the Executive Council signed the agree-
ment, they insisted it could not be implemented until the Ameri-
can government approved, for there was a clause in the Reci-
procity Treaty which required American approval before any
Hawaiian territory could be transferred or leased to another
power. So the Hawaiian authorities used the necessity of Ameri-
can approval as a means of delaying a final favorable outcome to
the British cable proposal while they sought to use the threat of a
British cable as a means to prod the Americans into developing a
plan for an American cable.38 As Hatch put it in a letter to the
new Hawaiian Minister, Lorrin A. Thurston, "Now that we have
got the matter started we can drop the British negotiations, or
keep them dormant for the benefit to be obtained from the mere
fact of the British application."39
It was a clever idea, but it did not bear fruit. The Congress in
early January 1895 did not approve President Cleveland's request
to allow the British to continue with their cable project, but then it
could not agree on what to do about constructing an American
cable. There was no agreement on what role the federal govern-
ment should play in financing, nor on the question of which com-
pany—several were formed to secure the cable franchise—would
actually be allowed to construct the cable.40 By 1897 nothing had
been done. After a scare caused by unofficial attempts by a British
firm to draw up a contract with the Hawaiian government using
Fanning Island as a cable station, a bill was drawn up in Congress
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and eventually passed early in July 1898. In the general confusion
attending annexation at that time, the bill was voided by failure of
the State Department to approve it. Hawai'i had to wait several
more years for a cable, which was finally constructed and became
operational early in 1903.
THE ROYALIST UPRISING OF 1895 AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
By far the most difficult and long-lived problem the British Gov-
ernment and Hawes had with the Hawaiian Republic was the
claims of British citizens arising out of the insurrection of January
1895. This revolt grew out of the refusal of Hawaiian royalists and
of Lili'uokalani herself to accept the overthrow of the Monarchy
in 1893 as final. Given the dissatisfaction among a large segment
of the Native population and the organizing and leadership abili-
ties of Lili'uokalani and some of her adherents, it was practically
inevitable that some attempt to reassert monarchist claims would
be made once it became certain that the United States would not
intervene to restore the Queen to her lost throne and that the
revolutionists would move to make their revolution permanent by
establishing a republic.
Plotting seems to have begun seriously shortly after the Repub-
lic's government was created in July 1894. In September, the
monarchists made their first move. The Hui Aloha 'Aina, or
Hawaiian Patriotic League, sent a petition to the British govern-
ment on September 22. The petition denounced the actions of the
revolutionaries as illegal and appealed "to the wider discretion of
the Powers that regulate the affairs of Nations to arbitrate in our
cause" to help to restore the Hawaiian Monarchy.41 A few days
later Herman A. Widemann, a former Cabinet minister and sup-
porter of Lili'uokalani, left Honolulu for Europe to present her
case before the European governments. It was a hopeless venture.
The United States would not support a restoration of the Monar-
chy, and all other countries including Great Britain followed the
American lead in doing nothing to subvert the Republic, an effec-
tive if unpopular government, in favor of the royalist cause. As
Hawes noted in a dispatch the day after the petition was sent, it
was too late for any action to support the Queen.42
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Widemann made no progress in his mission. He appears to
have concentrated on converting the British government, hoping
that British support would induce other governments also to sup-
port the royalists. But the British would not take even the first
step. When he arrived in London, Widemann asked for an inter-
view with Kimberley at the Foreign Office, but it was refused.
Kimberley did not even reply directly to Widemann, the reply
being sent by a Foreign Office spokesman who said no disrespect
was intended toward Lili'uokalani, but the British government
desired "to abstain strictly from all interference in the internal
politics of Hawaii."43 So that was that. The royalists in Hawai'i
would get no help from any outside source. They would have to
gain their goals by their own efforts.
Now that they had been abandoned by the powers, the next
move of the royalists was direct action against the Republic. To
some degree this was being considered even before the failure of
Widemann's mission to Europe. As early as September, Lili'uo-
kalani and her followers began to think about forcible action to
regain power, and the position of Wodehouse as a confidante of
the Queen allowed the British to become aware of the conspiracy
long before any other power, or even the Hawaiian government.
Now no longer British Minister and awaiting his release to return
to England, Wodehouse went to see Lili'uokalani on September i.
She told him that "her people were becoming very impatient for a
rising" and that plans were already being developed for a rebel-
lion, which she was confident would succeed. She said she would
notify the British Minister before the uprising took place. Wode-
house duly reported his conversation to Hawes, who passed it on
to Whitehall.44 Realizing he might have to act without further
authorization from his government, Hawes made arrangements
with the captain of the recently-arrived H.M.S. Hyacinth to be
prepared to land troops if necessary.45
The British were thus well aware of the conspiracy against the
Republic and had some knowledge of its leaders and its scope, but
nothing was done to warn the Hawaiian authorities.
The police authorities in Honolulu were not kept long in the
dark about the conspiracy.46 Their own agents were working dili-
gently, and from time to time people were brought in for question-
106 THE HAWAIIAN JOURNAL OF HISTORY
ing. Early in December one such group of arrests brought to
Hawes' attention the inescapability of British involvement in an
uprising. Among those arrested and detained by the Hawaiian
police were several British citizens, or people who claimed to be
such. Hawes wanted to know what laws they had violated, saying
a forthright statement on the matter by the Hawaiian government
would serve to calm the fears of British residents. Hatch replied
that British citizens had nothing to fear if they were not involved
in any plotting against the Republic.47
The police activity against the conspirators did not prevent the
uprising, but it did force it to expose itself prematurely. When
police investigated a report of an arms cache at a house in Waikiki
east of Honolulu early in the morning of January 6, 1895, there
was shooting and bloodshed. Their hands forced, the rebels began
to gather at Diamond Head and other places, and the government
called out its armed forces. This is not the place to discuss the Jan-
uary 1895 insurrection in detail, except to note that it was not
quickly contained and caused great anxiety among the leaders of
the government. On the other hand, even though the main fight-
ing went on for about five days and the main leaders of the revolt
were not captured until the 14th, the government had never been
in any serious danger. The government had acted quickly both on
the military and the behind-the-lines front, not only eventually
capturing all those under arms, but also rounding up a number of
people suspected of giving support to the rebellion.
The vigor of the government security forces in detaining sus-
pects caused the main difficulties with foreign governments, for
many nationals of other countries were among those caught in the
net. Hawes' first communication to the Foreign Office on the
rebellion noted that several British subjects were among those
arrested. He expressed concern that he had not been able to get
assurances that capital punishment would not be imposed.48
It was the beginning of a long and difficult problem for the Brit-
ish government which would not end until well after annexation
of Hawai'i to the United States. Hawes did act immediately to
keep the British government from being accused of participation
in the uprising. On January 8, Hawes told the Republic's Attor-
ney General, William O. Smith, that one of the accused rebels
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thought to be a British citizen had not sought shelter at the British
Consulate, but if he did appear the Attorney General would be
notified.49 He also allowed a detachment of soldiers to search the
Consulate—a most unusual concession, showing that Hawes was
leaning over backward to avoid giving any impression of official
British complicity in the insurrection. His actions, together with
the fact that there was no British warship in Honolulu Harbor
when the rebellion took place—Hyacinth had left two days after
Christmas—was generally convincing proof that the British gov-
ernment had not been involved.
But Hawes had an uphill battle to fight. There remained the
fact that several British citizens had taken part in the insurrection
or had supported it. The annexationists had no difficulty in
believing that even if the British government had not been
directly involved, that government was undoubtedly disappointed
that the rebellion had not succeeded. This might well have been
true, for the overthrow of the Republic would probably have led
to a restoration of the Monarchy and the end of attempts to bring
about Hawai'i's annexation to the United States, at least for the
near future. Such a view might also explain why Hawes did not
apprise the Hawaiian government of his information about a plot.
Having succeeded in dampening accusations against the British
government, Hawes turned to upholding justice for the British
citizens accused of participation in the rebellion. At first he was
not encouraged. His attempt to get the Hawaiian authorities to
agree not to impose any death sentences had failed, and their
decision to try the conspirators by a military tribunal instead of in
the regular courts caused consternation. The reaction of the Brit-
ish government was spirited. Lord Kimberley told Hawes that he
should demand a delay in execution for any Britisher sentenced to
death for complicity rather than participation, or for any British
participant sentenced to death if he had not received an open and
fair trial. Kimberley noted that the American government had
given similar instructions to its minister.50
The trials of the rebels were held before military courts during
the period January 17-30. Many of the defendants were British, or
claimed to be. One of Hawes' greatest problems was the sorting
out of citizenship; many claiming to be British subjects were later
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found to be naturalized Hawaiian citizens, with no claim to Brit-
ish protection. The greatest difficulty was over the question of
"denization," a peculiar arrangement wherein a foreign resident
in the Islands could sign papers giving him the right to take part
in political affairs—including the right to vote—yet not lose his
original citizenship. The Provisional Government had continued
the practice but required an oath to support the government.51
The alleged violation of that oath was the basis for the Hawaiian
government's claim of authority to try foreigners possessing let-
ters of denization who had taken up arms or plotted against the
Republic.
It was a complicated issue, too involved to be taken up in detail
here. It was time-consuming for Hawes, who spent countless
hours, even days, during the trials and long afterwards inter-
viewing prisoners, attending the military trials, examining count-
less documents, and communicating with his government.52 The
most critical cases involved those British subjects who were tried
and sentenced to death or life imprisonment. The British govern-
ment, through Hawes, kept a close watch to see to it that all
Britishers who were brought to trial received fair trials,53 and in
nearly every case it was satisfied that justice had been done,
restricting its remonstrances mainly to what it considered to be
the severity of the sentences.54 None of those sentenced to death
was executed, and nearly all sentences were commuted within a
year or two.
The most annoying cases arising out of the Counterrevolution
involved those who were arrested and detained in prison but
never brought to trial. A few of these were forcibly expelled from
the Islands. These people, mostly Americans and British, brought
suit against the Hawaiian government, and in some cases the
suits dragged on into the period after the Republic ceased to exist.
By the time the suits were seriously under consideration a new
British representative was on the scene. In early August of 1897,
Hawes died suddenly as a result of complications from a fall on a
trip to Hilo, and the new representative, W. J. Kenney, a former
consul in Formosa, took up the cases.55 By and large the Hawai-
ian government took the position that since the complainants had
not been tried and acquitted there was no liability on the part of
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the government. Kenney indicated that this view could not be
accepted by the British government and proposed that the cases
be submitted to arbitration "of an independent jurist of high
standing."56 The Hawaiian authorities were obviously pursuing a
strategy of delay, for by this time Congress had authorized the
annexation of the Hawaiian Islands. The British offer of arbitra-
tion would probably have been accepted if not for annexation, but
now the whole question left the jurisdiction of the Republic and
had to be referred to the government of the United States.
The subsequent history of the claims was long and tangled. At
the time annexation took place the Hawaiian authorities told the
British that the claims would have to be referred to the United
States. In 1899, the British pursued the claims with the American
government, and, in 1903, the Hawaiian territorial government
recommended the establishment of a claims commission to deal
with the problem, but the British preferred arbitration. Finally, in
1910, the two governments signed the Pecuniary Claims Arbitra-
tion Agreement to establish an arbitral tribunal. By that time only
eight out of the original 13 claimants were still alive. World War I
interrupted the activities of the tribunal, which were not resumed
until 1920. The last cases were dealt with in 1925. On November
10, 1925, the commission ruled in the cases of the five remaining
claimants and the heirs or representatives of two other claimants.
The claims were rejected on the ground that the Hawaiian
Republic no longer existed, and the United States could not be
held liable. "The legal unit which did the wrong no longer exists,
and legal liability for the wrong has been extinguished with it."57
THE TRANSITION TO ANNEXATION
Kenney probably did not realize that within a year after taking up
his duties in Honolulu, the Hawaiian Republic would be annexed
by the United States. He must have been aware, however, that
the entire energies of the Republic were dedicated to bringing
about annexation, and feeling toward that end was very strong
among the American residents. Hawes had noted this activity and
had expressed concern that the Hawaiian government showed no
interest in listening to Native opposition. He also believed non-
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American foreigners whose interests would be affected by annexa-
tion should have a voice. His interest in organizing petitions
among British residents, including sugar planters, had not been
supported by the British government, which continued to follow a
policy of abstention from any interference in Hawaiian affairs.58
It was a difficult policy to follow, and questions were asked in
London concerning the perceived supineness of the government
in the face of the annexation threat. In June 1897, questions were
asked in the House of Commons about what the British govern-
ment would do to prevent the Hawaiian Islands, which were so
important to British trade and cable communications in the
Pacific, from falling into the hands of the United States. The
reply was to the effect that the government would act to see that
lawful rights of Britain and its subjects would be maintained.59 It
was not a very helpful statement.
The British were not the only ones concerned about annexa-
tion. Toward the end of 1897 the German ambassador in London,
Count Hatzfeldt, spoke to Salisbury about his government's con-
cern and stated that if the United States moved to annex Hawai'i,
the British and Germans should jointly propose to get a share in
the administration of Hawaiian affairs or else an American with-
drawal from the three-way administration of Samoa in exchange
for a clear American title to Hawai'i. Salisbury was interested in
this unofficial German proposal but did not believe the Americans
would agree. The Colonial Office, to whom the matter was
referred, thought the proposal interesting but saw little gain for
Britain in Samoa.60 It might simply clear the way for a complete
German takeover of Samoa. Thus advised, Salisbury decided not
to join Germany in a statement, and he communicated this deci-
sion to the ambassador in Berlin.61
The 1896 election brought a major change in the annexation
picture. With Cleveland in the White House the British did not
have to worry about Hawaiian annexation, but the new Republi-
can administration reviewed the annexation question. At first
McKinley's intentions regarding annexation were not clear, and
opponents of annexation comforted themselves briefly with the
recollection that this was the same William McKinley who as a
senator had helped author the 1890 tariff which had caused such
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disruption to the sugar trade in the last years before the Hawaiian
Revolution.
The ambiguities concerning McKinley did not last long. In the
spring of 1897, State Department officials and a special Hawaiian
commission began negotiations on a new annexation treaty.
Signed in June, this treaty differed but little from the one nego-
tiated in 1893. In the Senate, however, the treaty became bogged
down.62 By early 1898 it had not been acted upon, and the furor
over the destruction of the Maine in Havana harbor in mid-Febru-
ary caused the treaty to be forgotten as the United States moved
toward war against Spain. The British could breathe more easily
again.
The failure of the Senate to act upon the annexation treaty
encouraged the Native Hawaiians to hope for the continued inde-
pendence of their Islands. Amidst the talk in Honolulu of what
failure of the treaty could mean for Hawai'i's future, a view was
advanced which stirred controversy and brought up questions
about British designs on the Islands. On March 1, the Hawaiian
Gazette published an open letter to the Hawaiian people by Theo
H. Davies, the British businessman who as Princess Ka'iulani's
guardian had tried to bring her to the Hawaiian throne to pre-
serve the Monarchy. He said that if the United States did not
annex Hawai'i the Native Hawaiians would have to face a situa-
tion in which the Hawaiian Republic would endure. The essence
of his plea was that the Hawaiians should accept the fact that the
Monarchy was dead and that they should now support the
Republic. In return, Davies said, the Hawaiians had a right to
expect to be allowed a greater role in the government and an
extension of the franchise.
Davies' comments stirred up a small storm of indignation in
most of the English language press. The Gazette commented that
Davies' proposal would give political power back to the Natives.
The newspaper added that Davies' assumption that the Natives
would line up with the whites to promote good government was
probably wrong, and that the history of the Monarchy showed
that a Native-dominated government would be a disaster.63 The
idea that the British were working to bring back the Monarchy
took hold and was quickly taken up and spread abroad. In a
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report to the Foreign Office, Lord Pauncefote noted that the Sen-
ate Committee on Foreign Relations' report on the annexation
treaty accused Great Britain of scheming to restore the Hawaiian
Monarchy and thereby to prevent annexation. Pauncefote stated
to the American government that there was "no ground whatever
for the allegations contained in this Report as to the attitude of
Great Britain respecting Hawaii."64
Pauncefote may well have been correct, since the diplomatic
correspondence of the Foreign Office shows no indication of a
British effort to restore the Monarchy. It is likely that whatever it
might have been considering in the aftermath of the coup of Janu-
ary 1893, Lili'uokalani's own unforgiving attitude and the unsuc-
cessful 1895 uprising had convinced the British government that
the Monarchy was beyond any hope of resurrection.
The curtain was raised on the last act of the annexation drama
by the outbreak of the Spanish-American War. Commodore
George Dewey's victory at Manila Bay and the subsequent send-
ing of an American Army across the Pacific to capture Manila
impressed the strategic importance of Hawai'i to trans-Pacific
communications upon Congress and the American public, and a
congressional joint resolution for annexation was quickly drawn
up and steered through Congress. On August 12, 1898, in a cere-
mony in front of 'Iolani Palace at which the former Hawaiian roy-
alty and practically all Native Hawaiians were conspicuous by
their absence, the Hawaiian flag was lowered for the last time and
the American flag raised, this time permanently.
There was nothing left for the British to do but to complain
mildly about the poor economic situation in the Islands, the obvi-
ous unpopularity of annexation among the Natives, and the con-
cern expressed about the form of government which would be
established in the new possession. Kenney pointed to local con-
cern that all the main government posts would be filled by Main-
landers, and he noted that the large debt of the Republic would
make it difficult to deal with the claims of Britishers arising out of
the 1895 insurrection.65
As far as Great Britain was concerned, the long struggle to keep
Hawai'i out of the clutches of the United States was over and had
ended in defeat. The futility of the struggle had been practically
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certain since the coming into effect of the Reciprocity Treaty of
1875 and was a foregone conclusion once the Hawaiian Monarchy
was overthrown. After 1893, the one forlorn chance to turn the
course of destiny around was the 1895 insurrection, which, if suc-
cessful, would have restored the Monarchy and would at least
have bought time for the British to try to find some way to pre-
serve Hawai'i's independence. The time bought, however, proba-
bly would have done no more than delay annexation to the
United States.
So the deed was done, and annexation was finally accom-
plished. The British government preferred not to dwell upon the
fact, however, and comforted itself by officially pretending that
nothing had really happened. When the Colonial Office referred a
question from the Hong Kong government as to whether the
annexation of the Hawaiian Islands had been recognized by the
British government, the Foreign Office replied: "H. M. Govern-
ment recognize the annexation of these islands as having taken
place, although no official communication formally recording the
fact has passed between H. M. Government and the government
of the United States."66
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